In social psychology, we need to establish a general theory of the self which can attend to both macro and micro processes, and which avoids the redundancies of separate theories on different aspects of the self For this purpose, we present core components of identity theory and social identity theory and argue that although differences exist between the two theories, they are more differences in emphasis than in kind, and that linking the two theories can establish a more fully integrated view of the self The core components we examine include the different bases of identity (category/group or role) in each of the theories, identity salience and the activation of identities as discussed in the theories, and the cognitive and motivational processes that emerge from identities based on category/group and on role. By examining the self through the lens of both identity theory and social identity theory, we see how, in combination, they can move us toward a general theory of the self In contrast to Hogg and his colleagues (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995) , we see substantial similarities and overlap between social identity theory and identity theory. We think that this overlap ultimately will cause these theories to be linked in fundamental ways, though we do not think that time has come. To show how such a merger is possible, we outline some important similarities between the theories; at the same time we note the differences in language, orientation, and coverage of the two theories as they currently exist. ' We believe that three areas are central to linking the two theories. First are the different bases of identity in the two theories: categories or groups for social identity theory, and roles for identity theory. A related issue is the place of person identities. The second area is the activation of identities and the concept of salience as used in each of the the-* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1998 meetings of the American Sociological Association, held in San Francisco. We wish to thank members of the Social Psychology Graduate Training Seminar in the Department of Sociology at Washington State University for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Direct all correspondence to Jan E. Stets, Department of Sociology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4020; e-mail stets@wsu.edu.
1 We recognize that this goal is a moving target because both theories are under active development.
ories. The third area involves the core processes that arise once an identity is activated. In this regard we discuss the cognitive processes of depersonalization (in social identity theory) and self-verification (in identity theory) as well as the motivational processes of self-esteem (in social identity theory) and self-efficacy (in identity theory).
For those less familiar with social identity theory and identity theory, we begin with a brief review of the concept of identity as used in both theories. Then we review the theories on the points identified above, with a focus on identifying the ways in which each might reinforce and complement the other. To outline identity in the two theories, we first discuss how each theory conceptualizes the self.
THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY
In social identity theory and identity theory, the self is reflexive in that it can take itself as an object and can categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories or classifications. This process is called self-categorization in social identity theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987) ; in identity theory it is called identification (McCall and Simmons 1978) . Through the process of selfcategorization or identification, an identity is formed. 224
In social identity theory, a social identity is a person's knowledge that he or she belongs to a social category or group (Hogg and Abrams 1988) . A social group is a set of individuals who hold a common social identification or view themselves as members of the same social category. Through a social comparison process, persons who are similar to the self are categorized with the self and are labeled the in-group; persons who differ from the self are categorized as the outgroup. In early work, social identity included the emotional, evaluative, and other psychological correlates of in-group classification (Turner et al. 1987:20) . Later researchers often separated the self-categorization component from the self-esteem (evaluative) and commitment (psychological) components in order to empirically investigate the relationships among them (Ellemers and Van Knippenberg 1997) .
The two important processes involved in social identity formation, namely self-categorization and social comparison, produce different consequences (Hogg and Abrams 1988) . The consequence of self-categorization is an accentuation of the perceived similarities between the self and other in-group members, and an accentuation of the perceived differences between the self and outgroup members. This accentuation occurs for all the attitudes, beliefs and values, affective reactions, behavioral norms, styles of speech, and other properties that are believed to be correlated with the relevant intergroup categorization. The consequence of the social comparison process is the selective application of the acceiituation effect, primarily to those dimensions that will result in selfenhancing outcomes for the self. Specifically, one' s self-esteem is enhanced by evaluating the in-group and the out-group on dimensions that lead the in-group to be judged positively and the out-group to be judged negatively.
As Hogg and Abrams (1988) make clear, the social categories in which individuals place themselves are parts of a structured society and exist only in relation to other contrasting categories (for example, black vs. white); each has more or less power, prestige, status, and so on. Further, these authors point out that the social categories precede individuals; individuals are born into an already structured society. Once in society, people derive their identity or sense of self largely from the social categories to which they belong. Each person, however, over the course of his or her personal history, is a member of a unique combination of social categories; therefore the set of social identities making up that person's selfconcept is unique.
In identity theory, self-categorization is equally relevant to the formation of one's identity, in which categorization depends upon a named and classified world (Stryker 1980) . Among the class terms learned within a culture are symbols that are used to designate positions-the relatively stable, morphological components of social structure that are termed roles. Thus, like social identity theory, identity theory deals principally with the components of a structured society. Persons acting in the context of social structure name one another and themselves in the sense of recognizing one another as occupants of positions (roles). This naming invokes meanings in the form of expectations with regard to others' and one's own behaviors (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 1980) .
In identity theory, the core of an identity is the categorization of the self as an occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and expectations associated with that role and its performance (Burke and Tully 1977; Thoits 1986 ). These expectations and meanings form a set of standards that guide behavior (Burke 1991; Burke and Reitzes 1981) . In addition, as McCall and Simmons (1978) make clear, the naming within identity theory includes all the things (including self and other) that take on meaning in relation to our plans and activities. More recently, identity theorists have drawn on this meaningful relationship between persons and things to incorporate the concept of resources (things that sustain persons and interactions) as a central component in identity processes (Freese and Burke 1994) . Much of the meaningful activity within a role that is governed by an identity revolves around the control of resources (Burke 1997) ; this feature as much as anything, defines social structure.
In general, one's identities are composed of the self-views that emerge from the reflex-ive activity of self-categorization or identification in terms of membership in particular groups or roles. Thus, although the basis of self-classification is different in the two theories (group/category versus role), theorists in both traditions recognize that individuals view themselves in terms of meanings imparted by a structured society (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 1980; Turner et al. 1987) . The bases of identity constitute the first area related to linking these two theories.
THE BASES OF IDENTITY
Much of social identity theory deals with intergroup relations-that is, how people come to see themselves as members of one group/category (the in-group) in comparison with another (the out-group), and the consequences of this categorization, such as ethnocentrism (Turner et al. 1987) . Here, however, we address the view of social identity on what occurs when one becomes an in-group member; and later we compare this with the view of identity theory on what occurs when one takes on a role.
Having a particular social identity means being at one with a certain group, being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group's perspective.2 In contrast, having a particular role identity means acting to fulfill the expectations of the role, coordinating and negotiating interaction with role partners, and manipulating the environment to control the resources for which the role has responsibility. Herein lies an important distinction between group-and role-based identities: the basis of social identity is in the uniformity of perception and action among group members, while the basis of role identity resides in the differences in perceptions and actions that accompany a role as it relates to counterroles.
In group-based identities, the uniformity of perception reveals itself in several ways (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner 1994) . These may be categorized along cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral lines. Social stereotyping is primary among the cognitive outcomes: researchers have found that stereotyped perceptions of in-group members and out-group members are enhanced and are made more homogeneous by identification with the in-group (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, Reynolds, and Eggins 1996) . Similarly, others have found strong evidence that group identification influences the view of the self as prototypical in the group (Hogg and Hardie 1992) . Still others have found that in-group homogeneity is especially strong when no motivational forces exist to distinguish the self from others within the group (Brewer 1993; Simon, Pantaleo, and Mummendey 1995) .3
Along attitudinal lines, people uniformly make positive evaluations of a group, when they become group members. For example, social identity researchers have found that individuals who identify with the group feel a strong attraction to the group as a whole, independent of individual attachments within the group (Hogg and Hardie 1992) . Similarly, others have found that in-group identification leads to greater commitment to the group and to less desire to leave the group, even when the group's status is relatively low (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997) .
Finally, people behave in concert within a group with which they identify. Even in a low-status minority group, for example, individuals who use the group label to describe themselves are more likely than not to participate in the group's culture, to distinguish themselves from the out-group, and to show attraction to the group in their behavior (Ethier and Deaux 1994; Ullah 1987) . Similarly, groupthink or extreme concurrence in decision-making groups is much more likely under conditions of high social identification (Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, and Leve 1992) . In addition, social identification is one of the prime bases for participation in social movements (Simon, Loewy, Stuermer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger 1998) .
In general, we find uniformity of perception and action among persons when they take on a group-based identity. This point contrasts somewhat with the consequences of taking on a role identity. Role identity theorists have focused on the match between the individual meanings of occupying a particular role and the behaviors that a person enacts in that role while interacting withothers (Burke 1980; Burke and Reitzes 1981) . This match includes the negotiation of meanings for situations and identities, and how they fit together to provide a situated context for interaction. By taking on a role identity, persons adopt self-meanings and expectations to accompany the role as it relates to other roles in the group, and then act to represent and preserve these meanings and expectations (Thoits and Virshup 1997) . The meanings and expectations vary across persons in the set of roles activated in a situation.
Early in the development of role identity theory, McCall and Simmons (1978) discussed the importance of negotiation in working out the differential performances, relationships, and interconnections of roles within a group or interaction context. If each role is to function, it must be able to rely on the reciprocity and exchange relation with other roles. Individuals do not view themselves as similar to the others with whom they interact, but as different, with their own interests, duties, and resources. Each role is related to, but set apart from, counterroles; often the interests compete, so that proper role performance can be achieved only through negotiation.
Evidence of negotiated roles is revealed in identity research. For example, research on leadership role identity found that when individuals could not negotiate differential leadership performances in a group that verified their identity, they became less satisfied with their role and less inclined to remain in the group (Riley and Burke 1995) . Other research found that the different gender roles in marriage result in different (albeit negotiated) behaviors for men and for women (husbands and wives) (Stets and Burke 1996) .4 In later work, Burke and Stets (1999) showed that when different but interrelated role behaviors and meanings are 4Taking the role of the other seems to move individuals toward the other's identity (Burke and Cast 1997). negotiated so that role identities are verified, a strong attachment to the group develops. Still other research has shown the disruptive effects that can occur in the family when fathers begin to take on some of the role behaviors that traditionally are performed by mothers (Ellestad and Stets 1998) .
In group-based identities, only the actor's perceptions and actions are directly involved; in role-based identities, other individuals in the group who occupy counterroles are directly involved in the role performance (Burke 1980; Burke and Reitzes 1981) . In group-based identities, the actor need not interact with group members. Indeed, the minimal group experiments in social identity theory precluded any interaction (Turner et al. 1987) . When most of the actors in a category hold the same perceptions, those perceptions are mutually reinforced, and group formation is the result (Turner et al. 1987) . Acting in unison, however, is the behavioral consequence for individual members, because they all have the same perceptions.
In role-based identities, some form of interaction and negotiation is usually involved as one performs a role (McCall and Simmons 1978) . Relations are reciprocal rather than parallel. Different perspectives are involved among the persons in the group as they negotiate and perform their respective roles, creating micro social structures within the group (Riley and Burke 1995; Stets 1997; Stets and Burke 1996) . Thus a role-based identity expresses not the uniformity of perceptions and behaviors that accompanies a group-based identity, but interconnected uniqueness. The emphasis is not on the similarity with others in the same role, but on the individuality and interrelatedness with others in counterroles in the group or interaction context. By maintaining the meanings, expectations, and resources associated with a role, role identities maintain the complex interrelatedness of social structures.
When researchers focus on the different ways in which people are linked to groups, through social identities and through role identities, they conceptualize groups differently. Social identity theorists regard the group as a collective of similar persons all of whom identify with each other, see themselves and each other in similar ways, and hold similar views, all in contrast to members of outgroups. Identity theorists regard the group as a set of interrelated individuals, each of whom performs unique but integrated activities, sees things from his or her own perspective, and negotiates the terms of interaction.
The group and the role bases of identity correspond to the organic and mechanical forms of societal integration analyzed by Durkheim ([1893 Durkheim ([ ] 1984 , which formed the basis of much discussion and theory in sociology. People are tied organically to their groups through social identities; they are tied mechanically through their role identities within groups. A full understanding of society must incorporate both the organic/group and the mechanical/role form because each is only one aspect of society that links to individual identities in separate but related ways.
To illustrate, let us consider the identities of teacher and student. First, teacher and student are roles that are defined within the group/organization of a school. Meanings and expectations are tied to each of these roles, regarding performance and the relationships between these roles. At the same time, teacher and student are social categories or groups that constitute (more strongly in some situations than in others) in-groups and out-groups. Here the focus is more on membership than on performance, and intergroup issues are prominent. Not all roles, however, are tied intimately to gr6ups. For example, the roles of husband and wife within the family are accompanied by meanings and expectations, but the social categories of husband and wife only occasionally constitute an in-group/out-group pair.
Whether one is a teacher or wife, she is at once in a role and in a social category. In focusing on the role, we consider the group (school or family) and the relationships among the different roles within that group; these are intragroup relations. In focusing on the categorical aspect, we look at the group of teachers, for example, in terms of what they have in common in relation to other groups such as students or businesspersons;5 these are intergroup relations. We point out that one always and simultaneously occupies a role and belongs to a group, so that role identities and social identities are always and simultaneously relevant to, and influential on, perceptions, affect, and behavior.6 For this reason we cannot easily separate role from group, either analytically or empirically (Deaux 1992b; Thoits and Virshup 1997) . Although it is important to examine how a person categorizes herself or himself as a member of a group, it is also important to observe the role that the person enacts while a member of the group. For example, group belongingness may be a function not only of self-categorization (Hogg and Abrams 1988) but also of assuming a high-status role iin the group.
Not only can we not easily disentangle group identities from role identities; we also cannot easily separate the group and role identity from the person identity. Both social identity theorists and identity theorists have discussed the person identity, but they have largely failed to examine how it might be incorporated into their theories. To establish a general theory of the self, we must understand how group, role, and person identities are interrelated.
In social identity theory, the person (or "personal") identity is the lowest level of self-categorization (Brewer 1991; Hogg and Abrams 1988) . It is the categorization of the self as a unique entity, distinct from other individuals. The individual acts in terms of his or her own goals and desires rather than as a member of a group or category. The level of identity that is activated (the personal or the social) depends on factors in the situation, such as social comparison or normative fit, which make a group identity operative and override the personal identity. Deaux (1992a) attempts to link the personal identity to the social identity. She argues that some features of social identities 5Whether one makes the comparison with students or businesspersons depends on the context. This raises the issue of salience, which we address later. 6 As we shall see, however, when we focus on one aspect or the other (role or group), certain features become relevant for understanding cognition, emotions, and behavior; these features have been emphasized by one theory or the other, but seldom by both.
are consensually based and will be expressed along normative lines, whereas other aspects may be based on personal feelings and values and will be expressed along those lines. Thus, idiosyncratic characteristics (one's personal identities) are added to normative characteristics of social identities. Although Deaux indicates that particular personal identities may be linked to specific social identities, creating unique ways of expressing membership in particular groups, she also suggests that some personal identities may represent a general view of the self and therefore may pervade all the membership groups to which one belongs.
Identity theorists conceptualize the person identity in a manner similar to social identity theorists. The person identity is the set of meanings that are tied to and sustain the self as an individual; these self-meanings operate across various roles and situations in the same way as Deaux believes that some person identities pervade all the membership groups to which one belongs (Stets 1995; Stets and Burke 1996) . Stets (1995) attempts to link person identities to role identities by arguing that the two may be related through a common system of meaning: the meanings of role identities may overlap with the meanings of person identities. For example, a masculine gender (role) identity is linked to the mastery (person) identity ("I am a competent person") through the shared meaning of control. Therefore, when one person acts to control another, this action is peformed in the service of both a role and a person identity. Stets observes that when the meaniings and expectations associated with role identities conflict with the meanings of person identities, individuals may act without regard to the role identities so as to maintain person identities. Thus, "while role identities need to be maintained, person identities also need to be maintained. An individual cannot simply be guided by role identities and have person identities unaffected by them. Overall, people need to balance the demands of role identities with the demands of person identities" (Stets 1995:143) .
Person identities penetrate role and group identities in the same way as role identities infiltrate group identities. If we can integrate these different identity bases and show how they operate simultaneously in a situation, we can address the degree to which individuals are constrained by structural expectations (tied to group and role identities) or have some choice in their enactment (through person identities). Further, we can examine how individuals resolve the distress that occurs when the meanings tied to different identities (group, role, or person) interfere with or contradict one another. Finally, we can investigate the degree to which some identities are more malleable than others: for example, people may be more likely to adjust their person identities to adapt to situations than to modify more structurally constrained role or group identities. We also can ex-plore the direction of influence of the different identities. For example, person identities may influence role and group identities when they are first taken on. Once a role or group identity becomes established, however, person identities may have little impact.
THE ACTIVATION OF IDENTITIES AND IDENTITY SALIENCE
The second area related to linking identity theory with social identity pertains to the activation of identities and the concept of salience as used in each theory. How and when do identities become activated in a situation? Social identity theorists originally used the term salience to indicate the activation of an identity in a situation. A salient social identity was "one which is functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one' s membership in that group on perception and behavior" (Oakes 1987:118) . In identity theory, salience has been understood as the probability that an identity will be activated in a situation (Stryker 1980) . When both definitions are considered in probability terms, it appears that social identity theory uses only the probabilities of 0 and 1, while identity theory uses the full range of probabilities. We discuss each in turn.
In social identity theory, although a salient identity is an activated identity, scholars have been concerned with understanding what makes a particular social categorization of the self (or other) relevant in a situation. As Oakes (1987) points out, salience is not about attention-grabbing properties of social stimuli, but about the psychological significance of a group membership. Early work on salience focused on the separateness and the clarity of the categories. This emphasis later was translated into a question about the distinctiveness of social categories. For example, minority status (McGuire, McGuire, Child, and Fujioka 1978) or relative numbers (Abrams, Thomas, and Hogg 1990 ) might make a category distinctive. In either form, however, this conception of what influences the salience of a social category did not take into account any of the realities of the social context. Those realities were general perceptual biases; they were not functionally related to the situation nor to the individual's behavior, goals, and motives.
Borrowing from Bruner (1957) , Oakes (1987) discusses the notion that salience is a product of accessibility and fit. Accessibility is the readiness of a given category to become activated in the person. It is a function of the person's current tasks and goals, and of the likelihood that certain objects or events will occur in the situation. As an example, Oakes states that the "taxi" category is accessible if one is in a hurry to get somewhere (goal) and if a taxi stand is nearby (situational object).7 Fit is the congruence between the stored category specifications and perceptions of the situation. Fit has both comparative and normative aspects. A social category has comparative fit when an individual perceives within-group differences to be less than between-group differences (the meta-contrast principle) (Turner et al. 1987) . A social category has normative fit when an individual perceives that the content of the category is defined along stereotypical, normative lines as held in the culture.
It is assumed that social groups are real for individuals who identify with these groups to accomplish particular personal and social goals. Oakes's extension thus makes salience more than a cognitive-perceptual feature; it is also tied to the social requirements of the situation, and results from an interaction between individual and situational characteristics. The activation of an identity in a situation allows 7The source of an individual's goals and purposes has generally not been considered. individuals to accomplish their personal and/or social goals. It seems ironic, however, that despite the focus on the activation of a group identity, the source of such activation is left to individual and situational variability and apparently does not depend on social structural characteristics.
In identity theory, scholars have been concerned more about understanding the effect of persons' positions in the social structure on the likelihood that those persons will activate one identity rather than another, and less about the impact of the particular situation on that process. In connection with this concern, the idea of commitment to an identity was introduced into identity theory. Commitment has two aspects (Stryker,and Serpe 1982 , 1994 . The first is quantitativethe number of persons to whom one is tied through an identity. The more persons one is tied to by holding an identity (i.e., the greater the embeddedness of the identity in the social structure), the more likely it is that the identity will be activated in a situation. In brief, the stronger the commitment, the greater the salience. The second component of commitment is qualitative-the relative strength or depth of the ties to others. Stronger ties to others through an identity lead to a more salient identity. When salience is made to focus on its probabilistic nature, it becomes a characteristic of the identity, not of the situation.
Employing this view, identity theorists distinguish between the probability that an identity will be activated (salience) and that an identity actually will be played out in a situation (activation). In contrast, social identity theorists have tended to merge the concepts of activation and salience, and to equate them. By separating activation from salience, identity theorists can investigate factors such as context (for example, the existence of an appropriate role partner), which activate an identity in the situation, separately from factors such as commitment, which influence the probability that an identity will be played out across situations.
In another way as well, social identity theorists and identity theorists have differed in their views of salience. In identity theory, salience has often been discussed in a relative way: two or more different identities have been examined in light of the different social structural positions held by an individual and the possible impact of each on that person's performance (Thoits 1983 (Thoits , 1986 (Thoits , 1992 . This notion, known as a salience hierarchy, addresses which role a person will enact in a situation when more than one role may be appropriate (Stryker 1968) .
Stryker also goes beyond the immediate situation by hypothesizing that people will seek out opportunities to enact a highly salient identity. Thus it is not a matter of an identity being activated by a situation, but rather of a person invoking an identity in a situation and thereby creating a new situation. For example, Stryker and Serpe (1987) found that first-year college students tended to decorate their rooms in the same fashion as they had done at home, thus reminding themselves and others of their identity. This agentive character of an identity has always been prominent in identity theory (McCall and Simmons 1978; Tsushima and Burke 1999) . The identities at the top of the salience hierarchy are more likely to be activated independent of situational cues. When activated, they act on the situation to accomplish self-verification; in the process they create a new situation.
In social identity theory, identities also are considered in a relative way because different identities are organized in a hierarchy of inclusiveness. Three levels are generically involved: a superordinate level such as "human," an intermediate level such as "American," and a subordinate level such as "southerner." The levels are floating and contextual, and depend on the salience of the different classifications (Turner et al. 1987) . At the lowest level, for example, an individual may see herself as a member of a sorority executive board, in contrast to other members of the sorority. At the next higher level she may see herself as a sorority member, in contrast to other sororities in the university. At a still higher level she may see herself as at the "University of X," in contrast to students from another university in a particular community or state. Different identities become active as the situation changes and as relevant stimuli for self-categorization change.
In social identity theory, salience pertains to the situational activation of an identity at a particular level. A particular identity becomes activated/salient as a function of the interaction between the characteristics of the perceiver (accessibility) and of the situation (fit). There has been little or no discussion about identities' creating or modifying situations so as to guide behavior.
Although these two theories have viewed salience in different ways, the different ways are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they may complement each other. Identity theory focuses on social structural arrangements and the link between persons; social identity theory focuses on characteristics of situations in which the identity may be activated; both.theories acknowledge the importance of the individual's goals and purposes. Thus an understanding of the conditions for the probability of and the actual activation of an identity can be found. Both theories agree that an identity has no effect without activation. To examine the likelihood that an identity will be activated across many situations, researchers must consider factors such as the fit of the identity to the situation (the stimuli present in the situation that fit the characteristics of the identity), which has been emphasized in social identity theory, as well as the individual's structural embeddedness or commitment, as emphasized by identity theory.
COGNITIVE AND MOTIVATIONAL PROCESSES
The third area related to merging identity theory with social identity theory involves core processes identified in each of the theories. The central cognitive process in social identity theory is depersonalization, or seeing the self as an embodiment of the in-group prototype (a cognitive representation of the social category containing the meanings and norms that the person associates with the social category; Hogg et al. 1995 ) rather than as a unique individual (Turner et al. 1987) .8 Activation of a social identity is sufficient to result in depersonalization. In this process, the person perceives normative aspects of group membership in the prototype and then acts in accordance with those norms (Reicher 1987 (Reicher , 1996 Terry and Hogg 1996) . Depersonalization is the basic process underlying group phenomena such as social stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, cooperation and altruism, emotional contagion, and collective action (Turner et al. 1987) .
Similar to depersonalization in social identity theory, a central cognitive process in identity theory is self-verification, or seeing the self in terms of the role as embodied in the identity standard (the cognitive representation of a role containing the meanings and norms that the person associates with the role; Burke 1991; McCall and Simmons 1978) . When an identity is activated, self-verification occurs. In this process, the person behaves so as to maintain consistency with the identity standard (Burke 1991; Swann 1983) . Self-verification underlies behavioral processes such as roletaking, rolemaking, and group formation as the person acts to portray the identity (Burke and Cast 1997; Burke and Stets 1999; Turner 1962) .
The processes of depersonalization and self-verification show us that membership in any social group or role includes two important aspects: one's identification with a category (emphasized more strongly in the depersonalization process), and the behaviors that we associate with the category (underscored more strongly in self-verification). Both identification with a social category and role behavior refer to and reaffirm social structural arrangements. People know the structural categories and relationships, and act in accordance with that knowledge. When we identity with the social categories that structure society, and when we behave according to the expectations tied to our identification, we are acting in the context of, referring to, and reaffirming social structure (Thoits and Virshup 1997) . In this way, a combination of the two theories would recognize that the self both exists within society, and is influenced by society, because socially defined shared meanings are incorporated into one's prototype or identity standard. In addition, it would recognize that the self influences society, because individual agents act by changing social arrangements to bring the self into line with the abstract prototype/identity standard (Freese and Burke 1994; Hogg, et al. 1995; Stryker 1980) .
In regard to the motivational underpinnings of an identity, social identity theory holds that when a group identity is activated, people behave so as to enhance the evaluation of the in-group relative to the out-group and thereby to enhance their own self-evaluation as group members (Turner et al. 1987 ). This process is the maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem. The self-esteem motive initially was thought to be the basis of in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism as well as of hostility toward the out-group. Although this idea was central to the initial formulation and development of social identity theory (Abrams 1992) , it has received mixed empirical support and thus has been downplayed in more recent work (Abrams 1992; ).9
As a substitute for the self-esteem motive, other motives have been suggested, including a collective self-esteem motive (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990) , a self-knowledge motive, a self-consistency motive, a selfefficacy motive, , an uncertainty reduction motive (Hogg and Mullin 1999) , and a self-regulation motive (Abrams 1992 (Abrams , 1994 . Any of these motives can be brought into play when the identity is activated and depersonalization occurs. With respect to the self-regulation motive, for example, Abrams argues that when a social identity is salient (activated) and attended to, responses are deliberate and self-regulated. Group members act to match their behavior to the standards relevant to the social identity, so as to confirm and enhance their social identification with the group. All of these suggestions are new; as Hogg and Abrams (1988) suggest, more research is needed to examine the efficacy of each in the context of social identity theory.
In earlier formulations of identity theory, motivation was tied to commitment and salience. The greater the commitment to an identity and the greater the salience of the identity, the more effort would be put into enacting the identity (Stryker 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1982) . Self-esteem was implicated as a motivator: insofar as an individual had a salient role identity, the evaluation of his or her performance would influence feelings of self-esteem (Stryker 1980) . If the role was evaluated positively, the person's self-esteem would be higher (Hoelter 1986) ; if the person performed well in the role, he or she would feel good, given the appraisals by others and their approval (Franks and Marolla 1976) . Self-efficacy also was implicated as a motivator, however: a person who performed well in a role gained a sense of control over the environment (Franks and Marolla 1976; Gecas and Schwalbe 1983) . These ideas are confirmed in recent research in identity theory, showing that self-esteem and self-efficacy are increased by the self-verification which occurs through performing a role well .
Recent extensions of identity theory have added consideration of the internal dynamics of identity processes and have included motivational elements of self-consistency and self-regulation (Burke 1991; Burke and Stets 1999; Stets 1997) . Similar to the mechanisms underlying perceptual control theory (Powers 1973) , affect control theory (Heise 1979) , self-verification theory (Swann 1983) , and self-discrepancy theory (Higgins 1989 ) is the idea that people act to keep perceptions of themselves in the situation consistent with their identity standard. They take actions to modify the situation so that perceptions of the self are consistent with the standard in spite of situational disturbances caused by others, prior actions of the self, or other situational influences .
As long as the identity is activated, the process described above is constant and ongoing, linking the individual to the situation, and it has been viewed as part of the self-verification process Swann 1983) . Two different manifestations of self-verification exist. First, when disturbances change the situation such that individuals perceive situated self-meanings and expectations of themselves as different from their identity standard, they act to counteract the disturbance. Second, when no disturbances occur, individuals act consistently with the meanings held in their standards.
We argue that identities referring to groups or roles are motivated by self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-consistency, and self-regulation. Indeed, recent research in social identity theory and in identity theory appears to be moving in common directions: both are considering multiple motives that lead one to act in keeping with that which most clearly represents the group or role. In considering multiple sources of motivation, we may find, for example, that the self-esteem motive is tied more closely to identification or membership in groups, while self-efficacy is associated more closely with the behavioral enactment of identities. Individuals may categorize themselves in particular ways (in a group or a role) not only to fulfill the need to feel valuable and worthy (the self-esteem motive) but also to feel competent and effective (the selfefficacy motive) (Cast, Stets, and Burke 1999; Stets 1997) .
The increase in self-worth that accompanies a group-based identity, however, may come not simply from the act of identifying with the group, but from the group's acceptance of the individual as a member (Ellison 1993) . This point may partially explain the mixed support for self-esteem effects in social identity theory (Abrams 1992; . A social identity based on membership in an abstract category may not yield the support and acceptance provided by a social identity based on membership in an actual group of interacting persons. The strongest confirmation that one is a group member may come from acceptance by others in the group. Further, enhancement of one's self-worth through group membership may involve acting so as to promote acceptance through appropriate behavioral enactments; such behavior has implications for fulfilling the need to feel competent.
CONCLUSIONS
We began with an assertion that identity theory and social identity theory possess similarities that make the linking of the two theories worth consideration. Such a merger would prevent redundancies in separate theories and would be a basis for establishing a general theory of the self. To this end we have considered three areas of central concern: the different bases of identity (group, role, person) , the different foci in examining activation and salience of an identity, and the cognitive and motivational underpinnings of the two theories.
In spite of their differences in origins as well as in language, orientation, and coverage, the two theories have much in common. In most instances, the differences are a matter of emphasis rather than kind. For the most part, the differences originated in a view of the group as the basis for identity (who one is) held by social identity theory and in a view of the role as a basis for identity (what one does) held by identity theory (Thoits and Virshup 1997) . We suggest that being and doing are both central features of one's identity. A complete theory of the self would consider both the role and the group bases of identity as well as identities based in the person that provide stability across groups, roles, and situations.
We think that a merger of identity theory with social identity theory will yield a stronger social psychology that can attend to macro-, meso-, and micro-level social processes. Such a theory would address agency and reflection, doing and being, behaviors and perceptions as central aspects of the self. It also would provide a stronger integration of the concepts of the group, the role, and the person. At the macro-level, for example, we might want to examine whether participation in social movements increases as one identifies with the group, is committed to the role identities within the group in comparison with other identities one claims, and sees the group as corresponding closely to the important dimensions along which one defines oneself. In other words, participation may be highest when individuals are linked at all three levels of abstraction (the group, the role, and the person).
At the mesolevel, we might want to study inter-and intragroup relations. The different roles that one assumes in a group may increase or reduce identification with the group, depending on (for example) power and status. In addition, the roles defined as more important to the group may influence hostility toward out-group members more strongly than do roles defined as less important to the group.
At the microlevel, an analysis of the group, the role, and the person may help us to understand more clearly such motivational processes as self-esteem, self-efficacy, and authenticity. It is possible that people largely feel good about themselves when they associate with particular groups, typically feel confident about themselves when enacting particular roles, and generally feel that they are "real" or authentic when their person identities are verified.
Yet, although the group, role, and person identities provide different sources of meaning, it is also likely that these different identities overlap. Sometimes they may reinforce who one is; at other times they may constrain the self. The conditions under which each occurs are important topics for future research.
